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Federal Taxation of Corporate Unifications:
A Review of Legislative Policy
Ulysses S. Crockett, Jr.*
Introduction
Historically and presently, corporate unifications' have played a
significant role in the economic development of the United States.,
Beginning with the 1918 Revenue Act,3 Congress accorded special
treatment to mergers and certain other business unifications; trans-
fers of stock in corporate reorganizations are currently afforded tax-
free treatment through nonrecognition of gain under sections 354,
355 and 356 of the Internal Revenue Code.' These tax advantages
* A.B., J.D., University of California at Berkeley; Member of the Faculty of Law,
Cleveland State University.
1. The term "unifications" includes the acquisition by one corporation of ownership con-
trol over another corporation by statutory merger under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
368(a) (1) (A); mutual exchanges of voting stock under id. § 368(a) (1) (B); exchanges of voting
stock for assets under id. § 368(a)(1)(C); and certain forms of liquidations under id. §§ 331,
337. Although distinctions may be drawn between these various forms of business adjust-
ments, there is arguably sufficient similarity among the unifying reorganizations for the same
tax treatment to govern all such transactions. They commonly involve the unification of two
separate business entities into another business entity controlled by the owners of the two
previously separate entities. See generally Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71
HARv. L. REv. 254 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Hellerstein]. See also 2 S. SURREY, W. WARREN,
P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 786-94 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
SURREY].
2. For an appreciation of the historical significance of merger growth see J. BUTrrEsS, J.
LINTNER & W. CARY, EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON CORPORATE MERGERS (1951); J. WESTON, THE
ROLE OF MERGERS IN THE GROWTH OF LARGE FIRMS (1953). For more extensive examinations
of the role of mergers in corporate growth see R. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN
INDUSTRY, 1895-1956 (1959); G. NUTrER, EXTENT OF ENTERPRISE MONOPOLY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1951).
3. Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057.
4. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 354-56.
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encouraged the burgeoning merger activity and resulting industrial
asset concentration in the twentieth century.' When the modern
industrial period was emerging at the turn of the century, the tax
subsidy helped to promote necessary economic growth. Today, the
economy no longer demands that federal tax laws provide an impe-
tus for further industrial asset concentration. This article will trace
congressional treatment and response to merger activity and the
developing laws. Having established the historical perspective, it
will examine some of the economic effects of mergers on sharehold-
ers, corporations, and the public treasury.
I. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Early Tax Treatment of Reorganizations
Prior to 1918, corporate unifications were treated for tax purposes
like any other sale of property;' revenue acts contained no provisions
allowing tax-free corporate reorganizations. The 1918 Revenue Act
was the first statute to deal specifically with the question of recogni-
tion or nonrecognition of gain or loss on the exchange of property.
The law provided for nonrecognition of gain in reorganization ex-
changes when the stock or securities received had a par value equal
to, or less than, the par value of the securities exchanged.7 Before
5. STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., MERGERS AND
SUPERCONCENTRATIONS 9 (1962). Industrial asset concentration refers to assets held and sales
made by fewer firms and controlled by fewer ownership units. Most studies use aggregate
assets as a measure of concentration. Relative concentration, by contrast, measures the
percent of market shares held by one business entity relative to the shares of other entities
doing business in the same market. Thus, relative concentration is a more accurate measure
of the market power of a firm in terms of competitive standing in a given market. See E.
SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 136-39 (1968). This article will generally focus on aggregate
assets as a measure of concentration, and will refer to this measure as "industrial asset
concentration."
The article will examine the way in which the federal income tax laws subsidize corporate
mergers and it will illustrate some of the economic effects of mergers. It will not compare this
influence of the tax laws with other management considerations which induce corporate
mergers.
6. Generally, where a shareholder of one corporation sold all or part of his interest in
exchange for an ownership interest in another corporation, the taxation of gain depended on
the relative similarity and extent of interest obtained in the new corporation. See, e.g., Marr
v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134 (1923); United States
v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921); Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921); Eisner v.
McComber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). See also Hall, Exchange of Securities in Corporate Reorgani-
zation as Income, 20 ILL. L. REV. 601 (1926); Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appre-
ciation of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967).
7. Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1060. The second paragraph of § 202(b)
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the Act's passage, congressional debate on the bill had focused on
the characterization of a reorganization. Proponents of nonrecogni-
tion argued that in comparison to other exchanges of property, cor-
porate reorganizations were "purely paper transactions";8 disre-
garded were the potential distortive effects, however small, upon
capital markets and the industrial structure occasioned by such a
provision. Instead, it was argued ionrecognition would aid in the
administration of tax laws.' Those who opposed nonrecognition
countered that regardless of the nature of reorganizations, busi-
nesses would use them to avoid taxation of corporate profits,'" and
that taxing reorganization transactions would lead to few hardships.
Despite the protests, nonrecognition became the general rule."
Thus, Congress cleared the way for the loss of a vast amount of
revenue by statutorily permitting reorganizing corporations to es-
cape taxation.
Arguably, the reorganization provisions of the Act were illogical
in at least three ways. First, immunity from tax depended merely
on the par value of securities involved in the reorganizations."
Second, the Act did not contain definitions of the terms
provided for nonrecognition of loss where new stock or securities of lower par value were
received in connection with a reorganization, merger or consolidation, but it did not specifi-
cally provide for the recognition of loss where the aggregate par or face value of the new stock
or securities transferred was in excess of the aggregate par or face value of the stock or
securities received. The second paragraph of § 202(b) was construed to apply only where a
gain was realized. If no gain was realized, it was necessary to rely on the first paragraph of §
202(b), which treated property as the equivalent of cash to the extent of its fair market value.
See I.T. 2024, 111-1 CUM. BULL. 54 (1924), overruling O.D. 932, 4 CuM. BULL. 46 (1921), and
approving O.D. 970, 5 CUM. BULL. 61 (1921).
8. S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 5-6 (1918), 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 117, 120.
9. The Secretary of the Treasury suggested four instances where transactions should be
included in the nonrecognition provision because of the administrative difficulties in comput-
ing gain or loss involved: (1) when the market value of the property received cannot satisfacto-
rily be determined; (2) when the property is exchanged for all, or substantially all, of the stock
of the corporation; (3) when property is exchanged between affiliated corporations; and (4)
when, in connection with the reorganization of a corporation or partnership, one entity ex-
changes property with another entity involved in such reorganization. See SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY, NOTES ON THE REVENUE ACT OF 1918 SUBMITrED TO THE SENATE FINANCE COMM. AND
THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM. 7-8 (1919). Some of the recommendations are now codi-
fied at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 368(a)(1)(B)-(C), 351.
10. 57 CONG. REC. 828-29 (1918). See also S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 3-4 (1918),
1939-1 CUM. BULL. 117, 120.
11. 57 CONG. REC. 828-29 (1918).
12. See R. PAUL, FEDERAL TAXATION 19 (1940). Additionally, the issuance of no par stock
was ruled not to escape from valuation. See Sandberg, The Income Tax Subsidy to
"Reorganizations," 38 COLUM. L. REV. 98, 102 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Sandberg].
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"reorganization," "merger," or "consolidation"; these definitions
were necessary to interpret which transactions would be exempt.
Third, the Act gave nonrecognition treatment to exchanges among
individual taxpayers, not corporations. Subsequently, in 1921, Con-
gress did define the term "reorganization"; 3 it amended the statute
to permit the receipt of "boot," which is money or other property
received in addition to stock or securities in a transaction, without
making the entire transaction taxable; 4 and it provided that a re-
organization exchange was nontaxable despite differences in the par
value of transferred securities. 5
The Revenue Act of 192416 permitted nonrecognition of gain if a
corporation operating a subsidiary corporation transferred part of
the parent corporation's assets in exchange for all of the subsidiary's
stock and later distributed the stock as a dividend to the parent's
shareholders without surrender by the stockholders of any of their
stock. 7 The congressional rationale for this provision was that the
kinds of exchanges covered were merely changes in form from which
no income was realized at the time of the exchange.'" In the Revenue
Act of 1924, nonrecognition provisions were extended to corpora-
tions as well as to shareholders. 9 The basis provisions for property
acquired by a corporation in a reorganization exchange were altered
13. The Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c)(2), 42 Stat. 230 provided in part:
The word "reorganization," as used in this paragraph, includes a merger or consolidation
(including the acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and at
least a majority of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corpora-
tion, or of substantially all the properties of another corporation), recapitalization, or mere
change in identity, form, or place of organization of a corporation ....
14. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 202(e), 42 Stat. 230.
15. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, §§ 202(c)(1)-(3), 42 Stat. 230. Statutory correlation of
the reorganization and basis provisions was also completed by the Revenue Act of 1921, ch.
136, § 202(e), 42 Stat. 230.
16. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 256.
17. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924), 1939-1 CuM. BULL. 241, 250-53;
S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924), 1939-1 CuM. BULL. 266, 275-78.
18. This rationale was later used to explain the extension of the nonrecognition exemption
to corporations. Regarding the parent corporation's interest in the formerly controlled subsid-
iary corporation, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see the transaction as
"continuing," especially where the parent corporation simultaneously turns over all or part
of the consideration it receives to the shareholders. This situation, taken with the fact that
the acquiring corporation might be allowed a stepped-up basis, makes it difficult to appre-
ciate the argument that the tax was merely postponed. See Sandberg, supra note 12, at 99
n.4, 103.
19. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 203(b)(3), 43 Stat. 256.
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by the Revenue Act of 192820 so that these assets would retain the
same basis for the new corporation as they had for the old corpora-
tion." This substituted basis rule was limited, however, to cases
where an interest or control of 80 percent or more of the assets
remained in the same person.2 In an attempt to prevent tax avoid-
ance, the substituted basis limitation was reduced to 50 percent by
the Revenue Act of 1932.23
A new limitation was imposed on tax-free reorganizations by the
Revenue Act of 1934;24 nonrecognition was denied where shares of
stock or securities were not in fact exchanged for stock or securities
in the original corporation. The definition of reorganization was
qualified so that nonrecognition status was conferred only on statu-
tory mergers or consolidations in which the acquiring corporation
transferred all or part of its voting stock in exchange for the assets
or stock of the acquired corporation. 25 In addition, the acquisition
by one corporation of stock of another corporation was excluded
from the exemption unless (1) at least 80 percent of the voting stock
and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock were acquired, or (2) unless substantially all of the
property of the other corporation was acquired in the transaction."
20. Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 852, § 113(a)(8), 45 Stat. 820. Under the Revenue Act of 1926,
ch. 27, § 204(a)(8), 44 Stat. 15, no gain or loss was recognized if property was transferred to
a corporation solely in exchange for its stock, and if immediately after the transaction, the
transferor was in control of the corporation. Generally, in such cases, the basis of the property
in the hands of the corporation would be the same as the basis of the property in the hands
of the transferor. However, § 204(a)(8) was not applied in the case where the property ac-
quired by the corporation consisted of stock or securities in a corporation that was a party to
the reorganization. The Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 113(a)(8), 45 Stat. 820, corresponded
to § 204(a)(8), but omitted this restriction in the reorganization exchanges. Additionally, in
the Revenue Act of 1928, a substituted basis was provided in the case where the stock or
securities were acquired by a corporation in exchange for the issuance of its own stock or
securities. Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 852, § 113(a)(7), 45 Stat. 819. See H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th
Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1927), 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 384, 397; S. REP. No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
27-28 (1928), 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 409, 428.
21. See H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1932), 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 457, 471.
22. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 113, 45 Stat. 818.
23. Act of June 6, 1932, ch. 209, § 113(a)(7), 47 Stat. 199. The rationale for this change
was expressed by the Senate Finance Committee:
This 80 per cent limitation has been reduced to 50 per cent to check tax avoidance,
for the reason that experience indicates it is easy to secure a temporary investment of
21 per cent of friendly capital in the new corporation and thereby secure a stepped-up
basis for the property transferred.
S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1932), 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 496, 516.
24. Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, §§ 112(a)-(d), 48 Stat. 704.
25. Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, § 112(g)(1), 48 Stat. 705.
26. Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, § 112(g)(1)(B), 48 Stat. 705.
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The House and Senate had proposed opposing amendments to the
existing definition of the term "reorganization." The House bill
would have eliminated acquisitions from the term." The Senate
view28 prevailed, however, and acquisitions continued to be afforded
nonrecognition status. It was argued that elimination of nonrecogni-
tion treatment would produce little additional revenue, particularly
because of the slumping national economic conditions at the time.21
Nonrecognition status was given to liquidations by the 1935 Rev-
enue Act. 0 A corporation could acquire control of another corpora-
tion, then liquidate the purchased corporation without tax effect. A
more comprehensive definition of liquidation was established in the
Revenue Act of 1936,"' which also provided that the basis of property
received in a liquidation would be the same as it was for the trans-
feror. 2 The 1938 Revenue Act, 33 further amending the liquidation
provisions, provided relief to the parent corporation in the event of
loss in the subsequent sale of property received in the liquidation. 3
Congress, in attempting to alleviate some of the effects of the de-
pression, thus provided additional impetus toward increased control
of the industrial economy by fewer corporate entities. This incentive
was increased by the Revenue Act of 1939, 3 which permitted the
assumption of liabilities in reorganization exchanges. 36 Further-
more, in response to the deteriorating condition of the railroad in-
dustry, Congress allowed nonrecognition of gain in bankruptcy rail-
27. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934), 1939-1 CuM. BULL. 554, 563-65.
28. See S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1934), 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 586, 598-99.
The Senate's rationale for including these acquisitions within the reorganization provisions
was that acquisitions sufficiently resembled mergers and consolidations to be afforded similar
treatment.
29. Hearings on Revenue Revision Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 57 (1933).
30. Act of Aug. 30, 1935, ch. 829, § 110(a), 49 Stat. 1020.
31. Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 690, § 112(b)(6), 49 Stat. 1679.
32. Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 690, § 113(a)(15), 49 Stat. 1684.
33. Act of May 28, 1938, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 447 (passed over presidential veto).
34. Act of May 28, 1938, ch. 289, § 112(7), 52 Stat. 487. See H.R. REP. No. 2330, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. 18 (1938), 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 817, 822-23; S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 17 (1938), 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 779, 783-84.
35. Act of June 29, 1939, ch. 247, § 213(a), 53 Stat. 870. See H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 19 (1939), 1939-2 CUM. BULL. 504, 518.
36. See United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938) (liabilities in a corporate reorgani-
zation treated as "boot"). For the current treatment of liabilities assumed in reorganizations




road reorganizations under the 1942 Revenue Act. 7 The public in-
terest in continued railway service was proferred as the justification;
the implications for industrial asset concentration were ignored. 38
B. Tax Policy of Corporate Unifying Reorganizations After 1940
The most recent period of merger activity began in 1940 and
reached its peak in 1968.11 Between 1967 and 1968 alone, over $15
billion in assets were acquired 4°-significantly more than the
amount of assets acquired in the first merger movement between
1890 and 1904, 41 and nearly matching the movement in the 1920's.42
37. Act of Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, § 142, 56 Stat. 838. The Act also provided that in the
case of railroad reorganizations which met the specified requirements, the basis of the prop-
erty acquired would be the same as the basis of the property in the hands of the old corpora-
tion. Act of Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, § 142(b), 56 Stat. 839. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 374(b).
38. See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1942), 1942-2 CUM. BULL. 504, 544.
Congressional regulation of the railway industry, along with these tax allowances to control-
ling corporations, closed this industry from healthy competition. The industry was easily
monopolized because of the high costs of investment and maintenance, its limited market
with the advent of the automobile, and the seasonal demand for railroad transportation.
39. FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT: CONGLOMERATE MERGER PERFORMANCE 11, 14 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as 1972 FTC REPORT].
40. See BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, ECONOMIC PAPERS 1966-69, Table 1, at 287 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as 1969 FTC PAPERS]. In 1950, acquired assets amounted to only 3.2
percent of new investments, whereas in 1968, acquired assets increased to 54.6 percent of new
investments. In 1968, over 35 percent of the total increases in assets over prior years were
generated by mergers. For a detailed discussion of the effects of tax laws on merger growth
after 1940 see Markham, Growth Incentives and Antitrust Policy, in WHAT PRICE ECONOMIC
GROWTH? 92 (K. Knorr & W. Baumol eds. 1961). See generally E. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCEN-
TRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM (1957).
41. Early mergers of companies from 1890 to 1904 have been characterized as "mergers
for monopoly"; their principal objective was to gain control of markets by combinations of
competitors and areas of production. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 87TH CONG.
2D SESS., MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATIONS 9 (1962). There were 92 mergers between 1893
and 1903; of these, 78 resulted in control of more than 50 percent of the output of the
respective industries. J. MOODY, THE TRUTH ABOUT TRUSTS 488 (1904). This period of merger
activity-the fastest merger growth period in the country's history-can be attributed to the
expansive nature of the economy at the turn of the century and the lack of antitrust law
enforcement. Once the Supreme Court, in Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197
(1904), determined that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 88 1-8, 26 Stat. 209
(codified, as amended, at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970)), applied to mergers which resulted in
market domination and restraint of trade, the merger movement declined. For a thoughtful
discussion of the role of antitrust law enforcement during the period of 1900 to 1950 see R.
HOFSTATTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERI-
CAN PoLrrTcs AND OTHER ESSAYS 188 (1965).
42. Smaller companies, which sought to improve their market positions by combining,
dominated merger activity between 1919 and 1930. During this period, industries which were
traditionally composed of smaller businesses, and which had previously been almost un-
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Most prevalent among the reasons for mergers since 1940 has been
the desire to move into new product lines or geographic areas; to
grow by merger rather than by internal growth has become com-
monplace.43 Financial advantages which generally accompany
mergers were sought-to afford larger sales over which fixed costs
may be allocated; to use one company's excess cash to acquire
needed working capital for the other party to the merger; to improve
a corporation's debt-equity ratio; to secure increases in earnings per
share and bolster market prices of stock; and to acquire sufficiently
larger sales revenue to support extensive advertising and promo-
tional activities. Management goals, such as the acquisition of key
sales, technical and management personnel, may also have moti-
vated recent mergers."
Tax provisions continued to provide a favorable climate for reorg-
anizations during this period. Nonrecognition status afforded rail-
road reorganizations was extended to other bankruptcy reorganiza-
tions by the Revenue Act of 1943.11 The "boot" rule was applied to
bonds received in a reorganization or recapitalization exchange
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,11 but recognition of loss
to either the corporation4" or to its shareholders" was discontinued.
In contrast to prior law, the acquiring corporation could, under the
1954 Code, transfer its voting stock to a subsidiary of the acquiring
corporation in exchange for assets without tax effect. 9 Moreover, a
transfer would qualify as a reorganization even though control of the
transferee corporation belonged to the transferor corporation or its
touched by mergers, formed new consolidations and expanded through acquisitions. Since the
Clayton Act § 7, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), prohibited
stock purchases that substantially lessened competition, a predominant feature of these
mergers was that many acquirers absorbed assets rather than purchased stock, thus circum-
venting the effect of the statute. This "loophole" in the statute remained until amendment
by the Celler-Kefauver Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), formerly ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
See J. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION ch. 11 (1972).
43. See Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 2411 (1969) (statement of Willard Mueller) [hereinafter
cited as 1969 Tax Reform Hearings].
44. But cf. 1972 FTC REPORT, supra note 39, at 33-60 (results of study of conglomerate
merger activity indicate few far-reaching changes in managerial operations of acquired com-
panies were made and no discernible effect on their profitability appeared after acquisition).
45. Act of Feb. 25, 1944, ch. 63, § 121, 58 Stat. 41.
46. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 356(d).
47. Id. § 361(b)(2).
48. Id. § 356(c).
49. Id. § 368(a)(2)(C).
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shareholders.' Such a transfer would not have qualified under pre-
vious law since it failed to meet the "continuity of interest" test5
required for a reorganization exchange.
An attempt by the House of Representatives to restrict the reorg-
anization provisions by changes in the definition of the kinds of
transactions which could qualify was unsuccessful in 1954.52 Under
the House proposal, statutory mergers and consolidations would
have been denied the status of nontaxable transactions unless other-
wise constituting "corporate acquisition of property."53 The bill
provided that if any corporation, other than a "publicly held" cor-
poration,54 was more than four times the size of the other partici-
pating corporation, the merger was taxable." This eliminated
"recapitalizations" from the nonrecognition provisions and treated
such transactions as stock dividend distributions." The proposed
50. Id.
51. Pursuant to the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(g)(1)(B), 53 Stat. 40, as amended,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(1)(B), the continuity of interest doctrine required that when
one corporation acquired another in a stock-for-stock or stock-for-asset acquisition, the ac-
quisition had to be solely for the voting stock of the acquiring corporation. The doctrine was
intended to prevent outright sales and dividends from receiving nonrecognition treatment in
a reorganization. To meet the same objective, under present regulations the Internal Revenue
Service requires continuity of interest in at least 50 percent of the value of all of the formerly
outstanding stock of the acquired or transferor corporation as of the effective date of the
reorganization. Tress. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955). See Rev. Proc. 66-34, 1966-2 CUM. BULL. §
3.02, at 1233. See also Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933),
decided under § 203(h)(1)(A) of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9. Acquisition by
selling shareholders of short-term purchase money notes was ruled not a sufficient interest
in the affairs of the purchasing corporation to justify exemption. In Helvering v. Minnesota
Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935), a transfer of assets for stock amounting to 71/2 percent of the
transferee's outstanding stock plus cash qualified as a reorganization. The test applied by the
Court was whether the interest acquired in the transferor corporation was "definite and
substantial" and represented a "material part of the value of the transferred assets." Id. at
386. For a discussion of the modern application of the continuity of interest doctrine see
Deming, How "Solely" is "Solely for Voting Stock": Current Problems in "B" and "C"
Reorganizations, 29 N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 397 (1971).
52. The House bill of 1954 abandoned the term "reorganization"; instead, it designated
certain kinds of transactions, such as corporate acquisitions of stock and corporate acquisi-
tions of property, as tax-exempt. See H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 359(b)-(d) (1954).
53. Id. § 359(c).
54. A corporation was deemed publicly held unless 10 or fewer shareholders owned stock
entitling them to more than 50 percent of the vote of all the stock outstanding, or held stock
with a value equal to more than 50 percent of the total value of all the outstanding stock.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1954), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4025, 4269-
70 (1954).
55. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 359(a), (b)(2), (c)(1) (1954).
56. See H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 359 (1954).
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House revisions were criticized for limiting legitimate business
transactions and for being particularly oppressive to the develop-
ment of smaller corporations; 51 eventually, the proposals were aban-
doned.58
However, as finally enacted, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
incorporated significant changes in the tax treatment of mergers
and consolidations incident to a corporate reorganization. By ex-
press statutory provision, a corporation could transfer part or all of
the assets it acquired to a corporation which it controlled, without
affecting the reorganization status of the merger or consolidation.59
The former requirement that sufficient stock to give "control" be
acquired in exchange for voting stock was eliminated. Under the
new law, nonrecognition applied to acquisitions of stock which rep-
resented a controlling interest in a corporation, acquisitions of addi-
tional stock sufficient to give control to an acquiring corporation
which previously did not have control, and additional acquisitions
by a corporation already in control.60 In a stock-for-asset transfer,
up to 20 percent "boot" was permitted to be received under speci-
fied conditions.' The parent corporation of the acquiring corpora-
tion was included in the definition of a "party to a reorganization. '6 2
Prior to 1954, the Internal Revenue Service was authorized to
disallow a deduction, credit, or allowance, not otherwise available,
in cases where control of a corporation was acquired principally for
the purpose of tax evasion or avoidance. The effectiveness of this
authorization was impaired by the difficulty of establishing whether
or not tax avoidance was the principal purpose of the acquisition.63
The Senate Finance Committee, therefore, recommended that in a
corporate acquisition, the burden of proof should be placed on a
taxpayer to show a purpose other than tax avoidance. This recom-
mendation became a provision of the 1954 Code. 4 Another Senate
57. Hearings on H.R. 8300 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Seass., pt.
1, at 533-59 (1954).
58. See H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1954), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5280, 5298-301 (1954).
59. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(2)(C).
60. Id. § 368(a)(1)(C). See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 273 (1954), U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4793, 4911 (1954).
61. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(2).
62. Id. § 368(b).
63. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025,
4067 (1954).
64. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 269.
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proposal, included in the 1954 Code as section 381, provided that a
corporation which took over the assets of another corporation in a
tax-free statutory merger, consolidation, corporate acquisition of
property, or in a complete liquidation of a subsidiary by its parent,
would carry over certain of the tax attributes of the corporation
which went out of existence. 5 The Senate Finance Committee
drafted a provision to limit the loss carryover relating to purchases
of stock of a corporation with a history of losses in circumstances
where the loss carryover was used to offset gains of an unrelated
business.66 The committee recommendation provided that if more
than 50 percent of the stock of a corporation was purchased within
a two-year period, and if the corporation thereafter engaged in a
different kind of business, the loss carryover would be eliminated.
The provisions were adopted67 despite criticisms articulated in the
minority report accompanying the House version of the bill. The
minority report specifically noted that corporations were given addi-
tional opportunities for tax manipulation and shareholders were
enabled to withdraw corporate earnings and profits and escape from
the higher individual surtax rates on dividends.
Section 19 of the Revenue Act of 195869 extended to minority
shareholders the benefits of section 337 of the 1954 Code, a provision
for nonrecognition of gain or loss in connection with a complete
corporate liquidation where 80 percent or more of the corporation
was owned by another corporation.70 In 1959, hearings before the
House Ways and Means Committee focused upon three areas perti-
nent to corporate reorganizations: statutory mergers, stock-for-stock
65. Id. § 381; See Hearings on H.R. 8300 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 3, at 1543.
66. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Seas. 39-40 (1954), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621,
4684 (1954).
67. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 269(a)(2), 382(a)-(b).
68. The report stated:
Under the guise of removing obsolete language and inequitable provisions from
present tax laws, the bill reduces taxes substantially for businesses, primarily corpora-
tions, and a few selected groups of individual taxpayers. ...
The tax reductions indulged in by the majority in this bill show a singular purpose
to benefit a small minority of taxpayers at the expense of a substantial revenue loss,
to the almost complete exclusion of the average taxpayer.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. B1 (1954), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025, 4594-
95 (1954).
69. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 19, 72 Stat. 1615, amending INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 337.
70. See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-31 (1958), 1958-3 CuM. BULL. 950-52.
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acquisitions in practical mergers,7 and loss carryovers under sec-
tions 381(c)(1) and 382 of the 1954 Code.7" Some Congressmen were
especially concerned about corporate use of the tax merger provi-
sions to effectuate further asset concentration. 3 To discourage tax-
payers from acquiring a corporation solely for its carryover of loss,
an advisory group suggested that a carryover by an acquired corpo-
ration should be limited to 50 percent of what was paid for the
business by the new owners. Congrees did not approve such a limita-
tion until 1971.14
Prior to 1964, a subsidiary corporation could not acquire the stock
of another corporation in exchange for stock of its parent corpora-
tion without tax implications. The subsidiary had to transfer its own
stock for the exchange to retain nonrecognition status.75 The 1964
Revenue Act amended the 1954 Code to allow nonrecognition treat-
ment in a stock-for-stock acquisition using the stock of the parent
of the acquiring corporation." The definition of "party to a reorgani-
zation" was also amended to include the parent corporation of the
corporation to which acquired assets or stock were transferred in a
71. The term "statutory merger" refers to those mergers permitted under INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 368(a)(1)(A) which have been effected pursuant to the corporation laws of the
United States or of a state, territory or the District of Columbia. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-
2(b) (1955). Practical mergers are defined in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 368(a)(1)(B)-(C).
72. An advisory group had attempted to distinguish between those cases where a reorgani-
zation is effected solely to obtain the benefits of a loss carryover under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 382, and cases where the primary purpose of the reorganization is to acquire the business.
Hearings on Recommendations on Subchapters C, J and K of the Internal Revenue Code
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 420 (1959).
73. Chairman Wilbur Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee remarked:
As a result of [the present tax treatment to corporate mergers], we must be concerned
about a very important policy matter. As you know, Congress is always faced with the
problem of concentration in industry. That matter is before some committee of Con-
gress for consideration almost every week that the Congress is in session. We should,
therefore, not only look to tax perfection and consequences in this area, but we must
also look to see whether or not our action makes it easier to accomplish further concen-
tration in industry.
Id. at 412-13.
74. See Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 302, 85 Stat. 521 (codified at INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 382(a)(1)(A)).
75. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1964), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1673,
1755 (1964).
76. Act of Feb. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, §§ 218(a)-(b)(1), 78 Stat. 57, amending INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (2)(C). The Act permitted a controlling corporation to
transfer to its subsidiary part or all of the assets or stock which were acquired in a transaction
without disqualifying the transaction from the reorganization provisions.
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statutory or practical merger.7 Correspondingly, the 1968 Revenue
Act afforded nonrecognition status to a statutory merger achieved
through the exchange of the stock of the parent of the acquiring
corporation for that of the acquired company.7"
In 1969, increased congressional concern over merger activity in
general and conglomerate activity in particular was manifested at
hearings conducted by the House Ways and Means Committee. The
Committee received extensive testimony regarding merger incen-
tives and the effects of conglomerate mergers on industrial asset
concentration; it heard various suggestions for curbing conglomer-
ate growth.79 Noting that the existing tax laws provided benefits for
corporations which used indebtedness in corporate acquisitions and
thus stimulated merger activity,8 ° the committee sought to restrict
this use of indebtedness. As a result, the following amendments
were enacted in 1969: (1) disallowance of interest deductions for
debt instruments issued in connection with a corporate acquisition
where the bonds are closely akin to equity;"l (2) authorization of the
77. Act of Feb. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 218(b)(2), 78 Stat. 57, amending INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 368(b).
78. Act of Oct. 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-621, § 1(a), 82 Stat. 1310 (codified at INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 368(b)(2)). In 1971, Congress further broadened the reorganization provi-
sions by extending nonrecognition treatment to statutory mergers using voting stock of the
corporation controlling the merged corporation. Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-693, §
1(a), 84 Stat. 2077 (codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(2)(E)).
79. See 1969 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 43, at 2363-550. Conglomerate mergers,
essentially, are mergers that involve neither horizontal nor vertical acquisitions. Horizontal
acquisitions are consolidations of firms that are direct competitors in the same geographic
market. Vertical mergers combine firms that previously had actual or potential buyer-seller
relationships. The merger activity of the late 1960's was dominated by the rapid growth of
conglomerates. Although conglomerate mergers may not have the obvious competitive impact
of horizontal or vertical combinations, they effect substantial organizational changes in in-
dustry: single-market companies are replaced by multi-market ones. 1972 FTC REPORT, supra
note 39, at 15-18. There have been recent challenges to conglomerate mergers under section
7 of the Clayton Act; antitrust law enforcement, however, has mainly been concerned with
vertical and horizontal mergers. Some commentators have pressed for more aggressive use of
antitrust law to bar conglomerate mergers with significant anticompetitive effects. See, e.g.,
Posner, Conglomerate Mergers and Antitrust Policy: An Introduction, CONGLOMERATE MERG-
ERS AND AcQUISITIONS: OPINIONS & ANALYSIS, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 529 (Special Ed. 1970).
80. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 103 (1969), 1969-3 CuM. BULL.
200, 202.
81. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415(a), 83 Stat. 613 (codified at INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 385). For a penetrating discussion of the pre-1969 law regarding the debt-
equity controversy see Stone, Debt-Equity Distinctions in the Tax Treatment of the Corpora-
tion and Its Shareholders, 42 TUL. L. REV. 251 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Stone]. Professor
Stone observes:
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Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations to determine
whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated as debt or
equity; 2 (3) limitation on the use of the installment method for
reporting gain on sales of realty and on casual sales of personal
property;83 (4) consistent treatment of the bondholder and the issu-
ing corporation regarding the original issue discount; 4 and (5) limi-
tation on corporate deductions with respect to convertible indebted-
ness repurchased at a premium by the corporation. 5 Section 302(a)
of the Revenue Act of 19718 extended the limitations on use by an
acquiring corporation of unused investment credits, unused work
incentive credits, excess foreign tax credits, and capital losses of an
acquired corporation. The 1971 provision thus restricted the use of
tax losses of the acquired company to decrease the taxable income
of the acquiring corporation. Although the provision was narrow in
focus, it diminished the tax benefits to corporations acquiring fail-
ing corporations in a reorganization, particularly with respect to
unused investment credits and capital losses.
In 1969-70, the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee
on the Judiciary conducted an investigation of conglomerate activ-
ity. 7 Its report confirmed the Federal Trade Commission's informa-
tion on conglomerate growth, 8 and speculated that the conglomer-
ate movement would continue to spiral into the early 1970's. Al-
The point is, of course, that "risk" is merely one characteristic of an equity interest.
The other element, at least equally important, is the benefit of the equity owner's right
to share in the corporation's unlimited success and growth.
Id. at 257.
82. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415(a), 83 Stat. 613 (codified at INT. REV.
CODE oF 1954, § 385). The authority granted the Treasury Secretary by INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 385 is permissive; the section includes guidelines which are based on prior judicial
tests in determining the debt or equity nature of an instrument. See Stone, supra note 81, at
265.
83. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 412(a), 83 Stat. 608, amending INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 453(b) (codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 453(b)(3)).
84. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 413(b), 83 Stat. 611, amending INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 1232(b)(2).
85. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 414(a), 83 Stat. 612 (codified at INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 249).
86. Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 302(a), 85 Stat. 521 (codified at INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 383).
87. See generally Hearings on Conglomerate Corporations Before the Antitrust Subcomm.
(No. 5) of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1-6 (1970).
88. See generally 1969 FTC PAPERS, supra note 40, at 264-313. See also 1969 Tax Reform
Hearings, supra note 43, at 2386-95, 2404-28 (statements of Willard Mueller and Richard
McLaren, summarizing data gathered by FTC).
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though overall merger activity declined after 1969,11 divestment of
corporate divisions by corporations increased as a percentage of
unification transactions. The continued existence of reorganization
tax exemptions was criticized in hearings before the House Ways
and Means Committee in 1973,"' but no major amendments to the
reorganization provisions were enacted until 1976. Thus, despite
congressional rhetorical concern with increasing industrial asset
concentration, recent mergers have continued to be subsidized by
the broadened merger tax exemptions . 2 The Tax Reform Act of
197693 did not directly address the tax merger subsidy issue. It did
89. Corporate unification activity in the second quarter of 1970 decreased by 15 percent
as compared with the same period in 1969. One factor contributing to the decline in activity
may have been the inhibitive effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §
411, 83 Stat. 604 (codified at INT. RPv. CODE OF 1954, § 279). The section limited interest
deductions on debts incurred in financing corporate acquisitions. See note 142 infra. For a
discussion of the impact of § 279 and a formulation of the role of pre-1969 tax law governing
debt-financed acquisitions, see P. STEINER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, EFFECTS, POLICIES 87-95
(1975).
90. Increased sales of corporate divisions may have been stimulated by the economic
climate as well as by tax advantages. The increasing inflation rate after 1969 created a
shortage of capital which may have encouraged corporate divestment for needed capital. In
addition, the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 512-13, 83 Stat. 638, amending
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1212 provided, in effect, that a company which experiences substan-
tial losses from the sale of a business may apply such losses against capital gains that have
accrued within three prior years. If a corporation qualifies for such treatment, the corporation
is entitled to a tax rebate. Thus, companies which made a substantial profit on the sale of
one division might save on taxes incurred if they can sell other losing divisions within the
three year limitation.
91. See Hearings on the Subject of General Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 358-67 (1973) (statement of Milton D. Stewart). A
major reason asserted for the "explosive rise in mergers and acquisitions of small companies
by large ones" was the favorable treatment of reorganization by the Code. Id. at 365. A
limitation on reorganization privileges to companies of a certain size was recommended as a
means of insuring the continued existence of small companies in productive markets. It was
further suggested that big corporations should be encouraged to "demerge" divisions which
do not fit their corporate structure or sell unprofitable divisions which might be profitable in
the hands of independent entrepreneurs. Id. at 366. It was alternatively proposed that a
progressive tax based on the size ot combining corporations should be levied on mergers and
acquisitions. Id. This suggestion finds support in the ostensible theory behind the progressive
rates and ability-to-pay principles of the federal tax structure. If there are economic benefits
to unification, the federal government should share in those benefits by the imposition of a
tax. The rationale of these proposals appears to be consistent with the present concern over
industrial asset concentration. See Blake, Legislative Proposals for Industrial Concentration,
in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 340 (H. GOLDSCHMID, H. MANN & J. WES-
TON, eds. 1974).
92. See notes 59-68 and accompanying text supra.
93. See Act of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
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provide restrictions on the use of loss carryovers on taxable and non-
taxable acquisitions, 4 eliminating one incentive for mergers. 5
II. PRESENT TAX TREATMENT OF MERGERS AND OTHER
REORGANIZATIONS
For a transaction to qualify as a tax-free reorganization, it must
fall within the statutory definition provided in section 368(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code; statutory mergers, acquisitions by one cor-
poration of the stock or assets of another corporation, consolida-
tions, divisions, recapitalizations, and transactions effecting mere
changes in form or place of organization are included in the defini-
tion.9" Predominant forms of nontaxable reorganizations are: (1)
statutory mergers or consolidations in which two corporations are
consolidated into a new corporation;" (2) a mutual exchange of
voting stock after which the acquiring corporation owns at least 80
percent of the voting stock of the acquired corporation and at least
94. Act of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 806(a)-(b), 90 Stat. 1598.
95. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 449 (1976), U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1222, 1260 (1976).
96. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(1) provides that the term "reorganization" includes:
(A) a statutory merger or consolidation;
(B) the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its
voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a corporation
which is in control of the acquiring corporation), of stock of another corporation if,
immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation has control of such other
corporation (whether or not such acquiring corporation had control immediately before
the acquisition);
(C) the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its
voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a corporation
which is in control of the acquiring corporation), of substantially all of the properties
of another corporation... ;
(D) a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation
if immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one or more of its shareholders
(including persons who were shareholders immediately before the transfer), or any
combination thereof, is in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred;
but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation to which
the assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under section
354, 355, or 356;
(E) a recapitalization; or
(F) a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization, however effected.
Id. § 354 provides:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a
reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for
stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorgani-
zation.
97. See id. § 368(a)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b) (1955).
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80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of its
stock;9" and (3) an acquisition of substantially all of the assets of the
acquired corporation in exchange for the voting stock of the acquir-
ing corporation or stock of its parent." In the third form, at least 80
percent of the fair market value of the gross assets of the acquired
corporation must be received; all or part of the remaining 20 percent
may be cash, other property, or assumed liabilities of the acquired
corporation.10 Under present law, tax-free mergers can even be ac-
complished by the use of stock in a newly formed subsidiary created
solely for the purpose of acquisition.' 0 '
In the case of a reorganization that meets the requirements of
section 368, no gain or loss arising out of the exchange, except to the
extent of "boot" received, will be recognized until the property is
ultimately disposed of by its recipients.'0 2 The tax basis of property
and other tax attributes of the acquired company are applied to the
acquiring corporation .103 Recognition of gain by an acquired corpora-
tion is deferred if stock is received and if any cash or other property
received is distributed to the selling shareholders.'04 Exchanges of
property unequal in value are generally taxable events,' 5 but the
sale of a business which qualifies as a reorganization is free from tax
at the time of the exchange. Since this deferral is the equivalent of
98. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(1)(B).
99. See id. §§ 368(a)(1)(C), (2)(B).
100. See id. §§ 368(a)(2)(B), 357. See also Crockett & Kiesewetter, Should Liabilities
Assumed in Corporate Reorganizations be Tax Free? A Discussion of Congressional Policy
and Judicial Interpretation, 8 CREIGHTON L. REv. 399 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Crockett &
Kiesewetter]. The Internal Revenue Service has recognized that a transaction qualifies as a
tax-exempt reorganization if at least 90 percent of the fair market value of the net assets and
at least 70 percent of the fair market value of the gross assets of the acquired corporation are
held by the acquiring entity immediately prior to the transfer. See Rev. Proc. 66-34, 1966-2
CUM. BULL. § 3.01, at 1233.
101. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 368(a)(1)(A), (D), (E). Since the inclusion of the
reorganization provisions in 1918, Congress has seldom attempted to constrain their opera-
tion. See notes 27-29 & 52-58 and accompanying text supra.
102. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 88 354, 361. But see id. § 368(a)(1)(C), permitting limited
"boot" to be received. A shareholder of the acquired corporation recognizes gain only to the
extent that "boot" is received from the acquiring corporation or from its parent. See id. §§
354(a), 356. For the statutory treatment of liabilities assumed in connection with corporate
reorganizations see id. § 357. See also Crockett & Kiesewetter, supra note 100, at 414-29.
103. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 362(b), 381(c). See id. § 382.
104. Id. §§ 361(a)-(b). If cash or other property is received by the acquired corporation
and not distributed to shareholders, then gain (but not loss) will be recognized up to the
amount of cash or other property received. Id. §§ 361(b)(1)(B)-(b)(2).
105. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001-02. But see id. §§ 1031, 1033 for the tax-free treat-
ment of exchanges of "like property" and involuntarily converted property.
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an exemption, it constitutes an immediate tax advantage, a subsidy
to the acquiring corporation and its shareholders. 06
III. DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF THE TAX MERGER SUBSIDY
The nonrecognition provisions'017 of the current tax law are influ-
ential in planning corporate mergers; 08 they have a significant im-
pact on the shareholders of a corporation, the corporation itself,
and, indeed, even the public treasury. Thus, an examination of the
subsidy's effects and the difficulties which would arise in eliminat-
ing favorable tax treatment of reorganizations will be attempted in
this section.
A. Effects on Shareholders
The shareholder-the individual-is acutely affected by the sub-
sidy. The main argument supporting nonrecognition of gain to
shareholders in a reorganization exchange0 9 is that such an ex-
change is purely a paper transaction, a mere change in form, not
substance. Yet, when a shareholder receives publicly traded stock,
a sufficient change in his economic position has occurred to justify
the assessment of a tax.10 Publicly traded stock, due to its liquidity,
is sufficiently equivalent to cash for some of the securities received
106. Moreover, under the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 334, if the acquiring corporation
receives property in partial or complete liquidation, its shareholders may receive corporate
assets with a basis equal to the fair market value at the time of the distribution, if gain or
loss is recognized on the transaction. The liquidating corporation will generally recognize no
gain or loss on the transaction. Id. § 336. Accordingly, a corporate taxpayer could escape tax
altogether through the unrecognized gain resulting from a prior unifying transaction. For
examples of this "equivalency of deferral with exemption" see 1 SURREY, supra note 1, at 413-
21.
107. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 351-68, 371. 373-74.
108. See, e.g., 1969 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 43, at 5493 (remarks of Edwin S.
Cohen, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
109. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 354-58, 368.
110. When a publicly held corporation acquires a significantly smaller company, the degree
of each shareholder's control may be substantially changed. The only shareholder interest not
obviously altered is his investment interest, but this, too, is changed in the sense that the
value of his investment changes where stock is transferred in exchange for a package of stock
and securities of an acquiring corporation. Also, the newly acquired, publicly traded stock
can be used as security, unlike privately held stock which is less marketable, if at all. See
Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 270. Large mergers grant "a significant economic gain for share-
holders of the selling enterprise." Lovett, Tax Subsidies for Merger: Should Mergers Be Made
to Meet a Market Test for Efficiency?, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 844, 851 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Lovett].
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to be sold to pay the tax on any gain realized on the transaction by
the shareholders."' However, a shareholder might argue against rec-
ognizing the equivalency of stock and cash by asserting that their
equivalency is lost in the process of conversion. Brokerage commis-
sions, exchange fees, stock transfer taxes and capital gains taxes
might be incurred in the sale of acquired stock. The shares received
may appreciate between the time of the exchange and the time
when the tax obligation becomes due. The shareholder, expecting
an additional increase in value, may not wish to sell the shares to
pay the taxes. Thus, if a tax were imposed on a merger or other
corporate reorganization, shareholders might often be reluctant to
support a proposed unifying transaction which would give them no
cash to pay their tax liability. The unfairness of a tax on the merger
to a small shareholder, who is unable to pay the tax without cashing
in his stock, could be averted by adopting a principle found else-
where in the Internal Revenue Code: a taxpayer who does not freely
enter into a transaction should not be required to recognize gain."2
If the merger were a taxable event, there could be an exemption for
those who opposed the merger, if they reinvest the proceeds in like
property within a specified period.
The problem of valuation"3 created by eliminating nonrecognition
is less easily solved. When a large number of shareholders sell the
shares they received in a reorganization exchange, it is possible that
the rush of offerings to sell would depress the market price. Thus,
if the shares had a higher value at the time of exchange than at the
time of sale, each shareholder might be deprived of part of the gain
for which he would be taxed. One approach to this problem might
111. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 282. To limit tax avoidance, the House proposal for the
1954 amendments to the reorganization provisions would have taxed acquisitions of compa-
nies one-fourth and above the size of the acquiring company. See H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 359(a), (b)(2), (c)(1) (1954). See also M. DAVID & R. MILLER, THE LIFETIME DISTRIBU-
TION OF REALIZED CAPITAL GAINS, in JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92D CONG., 2D SESS., THE ECONOM-
ICS OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS pt. 3, at 269-84 (Comm. Print 1972).
112. Nonrecognition treatment is granted to other involuntary conversions such as insur-
ance proceeds from fire or theft of property, or condemnation awards which are reinvested in
similar property or property related in service or use. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1033(a)
(involuntary conversions). See also id. §§ 1031, 1034, 1036.
113. For a detailed discussion of valuation problems see Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary
Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967). A method of
alternate valuation could be established for stocks and securities so that they could either be
valued at the time of the exchange, or at a later date when their value is reasonably ascertain-
able. A similar method is now used by the Code in the valuation of a decedent's gross estate.
See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2032.
1976
Duquesne Law Review
be to impose a tax on the realized gain only if an adequate market
exists for the sale of the stock; market value at the time of sale could
be used to determine gain."' A significant problem with this alter-
native, however, is determining the existence of an adequate mar-
ket. Who is to determine if an adequate market exists, and by what
standards? In 1934, the Treasury Department recognized that sub-
stantial administrative problems of valuation would accompany the
elimination of the reorganization provisions and did not accept the
task of valuation."' Arguably, however, the problem of valuation is
no more complex than the problem of determining which mergers
meet the reorganization requirements. Indeed, the government
spends substantial amounts to determine if mergers qualify for tax
subsidy treatment."' If the nonrecognition provisions were elimi-
nated, not only would time and expense be saved at the initial ruling
stage, but also, revenues would flow into the government treasury.
There may be an additional cost to the government of policing tax-
payer valuation estimates occasioned by corporate acquisitions, but
this would be considerably less than the sum collected in taxes on
reorganizations. Moreover, the taxpayer has the first opportunity to
value property, stock, or securities for tax purposes, and the anti-
fraud provisions of Subtitle F of the Internal Revenue Code"7 would
be a deterrent to the use of improper valuation methods.
Although nonrecognition appears at first blush to be beneficial to
shareholders, the advantages of nonrecognition may not be as great
in the case of shareholders involved in conglomerate merger activ-
ity. Individual, noncontrolling shareholders may suffer a loss of in-
formation regarding corporate worth when such mergers take place.
Employment of the pooling of interest method of accounting has
been particularly criticized for failing to account accurately for the
cost of buying a business;"' it arguably misleads investors.
Available to conglomerates formed by an exchange of voting stock,
the pooling of interest accounting method simply permits the book
114. See Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 284.
115. See Cohen, Conglomerate Mergers and Taxation, 55 A.B.A.J. 40, 42 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Cohen].
116. In 1974, $18.87 million was spent on requests for rulings and technical advice, much
of which involved determining if reorganizations qualified for tax subsidy treatment. See
1974 COMM'R OF INT. REv. ANN. REP. 30, 50, 108.
117. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6653(b), 7201.
118. D. EITEMAN, POOLING AND PURCHASE ACCOUNTING 141 (1967).
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values of both firms to be added together."9 Book value, however,
has no direct relation to the actual market value of the firm ac-
quired; it is the historical cost of a company's assets, not its present
worth. The pooling of interest technique, therefore, suppresses the
cost of acquisitions and perpetuates the distortion of true economic
values. Failure of the firm to report divisional profits may also be
misleading. By definition, a conglomerate is composed of many dif-
ferent product lines and the chance that each division performs as
well as others is highly unlikely. A single earnings figure cannot
possibly describe the performance of each division. Shareholders
cannot realistically predict the future earnings of a diversified firm
when they have access only to single earnings figures. Moreover, the
reporting requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission
do not ensure that adequate information is filed at the time of the
merger. 2° As a result, the shareholder is often ignorant of the actual
worth of his investment in a unifying combination.
It cannot simply be concluded, however, that mergers are con-
trary to the shareholders' interests. While it has been asserted that
the shareholders' interests are often sacrificed for the sake of artifi-
119. See Gormley, The Pooling of Interests Principle of Accounting-A Lawyer's View,
23 Bus. LAW. 407 (1968).
120. SEC Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1976), which generally exempted from registra-
tion requirements (though not from proxy statement requirements) securities issued in a
statutory merger, consolidation, or asset acquisition, was rescinded, effective January 1,
1973. The "no sale" theory of Rule 133 was replaced by Rule 145, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1976),
which was designed to make available some of the more important informational aspects of
the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970), "to persons
who are offered securities in a business combination." Transactions within the scope of Rule
145 include statutory mergers, consolidations or similar plans or acquisitions, and transfers
of assets in connection with a plan or agreement for dissolution of a corporation. In recognition
that "no one rule can adequately cover all legitimate private offers and sales of securities,"
Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1976), was also promulgated. It clarifies when § 4(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1970), which recognizes certain exemptions from
registration, is available. It is unclear how effective the new rules will be. See J. WESTON,
REGULATING TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES 97-98 (1975) (address by Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman
of the SEC, April 30, 1974).
In addition, data on conglomerate activities with respect to sales, profits, losses, and other
economic and management information by "line of business" as well as information on
specific product markets is inadequate. Accordingly, the government has difficulty making
effective policy decisions concerning antitrust enforcement and industrial asset concentra-
tion. The Federal Trade Commission has requested that Congress fund a study of the top 500
corporations by "line of business." See Dalton & Penn, Antitrust and the Snare of Published




cial growth through corporate conglomeration,"2 ' studies show that
shareholders' returns average about the same as returns for share-
holders in average-sized manufacturing units; conglomerates have
a profit ratio comparable to most large firms.'22 In addition, man-
agement and shareholder interests may be well-integrated where the
chief executives are the major stockholders.'23 Tax-free mergers, too,
may provide immediate economic benefits to shareholders or secu-
rity holders involved in unifying corporate reorganizations.'2 For
example, publicly traded stock is often received for less marketable
closely held stock; since gain is not recognized on the exchanges, the
shareholder has an opportunity to delay selling the acquired stock
until other income is low, or when other capital losses exist to offset
gains.
It can be concluded that a shareholder is affected both nega-
tively-by sustaining a loss of information-and positively-
through sharing in corporate growth-by mergers encouraged by
the tax subsidy. Yet, even if these consequences to shareholders
offset each other, they must be assessed in light of the fact that in
a tax-free exchange the shareholder receives an arguably unde-
served tax benefit. The gain should not go unrecognized simply by
designating the transfer as a "mere paper transaction," or because
of the difficulties encountered in payment of the tax or in valuation
of the property involved.
121. The following is an example of how artificial growth is accomplished in a unifying
reorganization:
Assume Company A has a million shares earning $1 each; they are selling at $30 a
share because the market judges A's growth favorably. Now assume Company B also
has a million shares earning $1 each; they are selling at only $10 a share because B
shows no internal growth at all. So A generously offers B's stockholders $15 a share,
either in cash, which it can easily raise, or preferably in A's own stock, which has the
advantage of exempting B's stockholders from an immediate capital-gains tax. In other
words, A trades 500,000 of its own shares for all of B's million shares. So the new
company is capitalized at 1,500,000 shares earning $2 million. This works out not to
$1 a share, as before the merger, but to $1.33. Although nothing really has changed in
the companies and the economy is certainly no richer, earnings per share are a third
higher. On the strength of this showing, the market bids the new stock to an even
higher multiple.
Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 81.
122. Weston & Mansinghka, Tests of the Efficiency Performance of Conglomerate Firms,
in THE IMPACT OF LARGE FIRMS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY, ch. 15 (J. Weston & S. Ornstein eds.
1973). Cf. 1972 FTC REPORT, supra note 39, at 55-60.
123. W. LEWELLEN, THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT 11-12 (1971).
124. See generally DeWind, The Impact of Tax Factors, 25 Bus. LAW. 765 (1970).
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B. Effects on Corporations
Corporations enjoy a significant tax bargain in reorganizations
qualifying under the present tax provisions. Prime examples of fa-
vorable treatment are the loss carryover'2 5 allowances in the Internal
Revenue Code.'2  The carryover of net operating loss in reorganiza-
tions enables some income of the acquiring corporation completely
to avoid income tax treatment. The Code limits this tax avoidance
by allowing the loss carryover only to the extent that it is applied
to future income from substantially the same kind of business. 121
Moreover, federal courts have developed principles to ensure that
mergers follow the spirit of the Code provisions, including the conti-
nuity of interest 28 and business purpose 12 doctrines and the step-
125. Loss carryovers are allowable business losses of the merged firms which cannot be
offset by current income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172. See B. BrrIKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, chs. 13, 16 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
BITTKER & EUSTiCE].
126. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 172, 381-82. But see id. § 269(a), which provides that
the tax benefits to a person or corporation from acquisition of control of another corporation
may be disallowed where the acquisition was made for the principal purpose of income tax
evasion or avoidance. The Code also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate
to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances among
businesses controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, if necessary to prevent tax
evasion or to clearly reflect income. Id. § 269(b). See also id. § 482.
127. Under the 1954 Code a net operating loss carryover is disqualified when: (1) an
increase of at least 50 percentage points occurs in the stock ownership of a corporation by a
prescribed number of persons within a taxable year; (2) the increase in ownership is attributa-
ble to purchase of the stock; and (3) the corporation has not continued to carry on a business
or trade substantially the same as that conducted before the change in percentage ownership
of the stock occurred. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 382(a). See Fawn Fashions, Inc., 41 T.C. 205
(1963). If, as a result of their stock ownership prior to reorganization, stockholders of the "loss
corporation" do not own at least 20 percent of the fair market value of the stock of the
acquiring corporation, the total net operating loss carryover from prior taxable years of the
"loss corporation" is reduced. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 382(b)(1). See also Libson Shops,
Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 386 (1957); Commissioner v. Barclay Jewelry, Inc., 367 F.2d
193 (1st Cir. 1966).
The above rules have been substantially modified by the provisions of the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 806(a)-(e), 90 Stat. 1598. Of primary importance, § 806(e)
amends the limitations on net operating loss carryovers set out in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
382; under the new law, the test for carryovers will no longer depend on whether the loss
corporation continues in its same business or trade.
128. The continuity of interest doctrine requires that the original owners retain an interest
in the reorganized corporation. This doctrine does not demand that the new corporation
engage in the same or similiar business as that of its predecessor; all that is required is that
there be a continuity of business activity. Becher v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.
1955). For a discussion of the origin of the doctrine see note 51 supra. See Tarleau,
"Continuity of Business Enterprise" in Corporate Reorganizations and Other Corporate
Readjustments, 60 CoLuM. L. REV. 792 (1960).
129. A sound business purpose for the corporate acquisition is required for a transaction
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transaction rule for examining the exchange. 3 " Thus, a reorganiza-
tion which facially meets carryover requirements may still be chal-
lenged and disqualified if the acquisition was a "sham" transac-
tion-one in form, but not in substance. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has declared:
There is . . . no indication . . . that these provisions were
designed to permit the averaging of the pre-merger losses of one
business with the post-merger income of some other business
which had been operated and taxed separately before the
merger. What history there is suggests that Congress primarily
was concerned with the fluctuating income of a single busi-
ness.'
13
The Tax Reform Act of 197632 restricts tax benefits from the use
of loss carryovers by increasing the required percentage of ownership
in the acquiring company by those who previously owned the loss
company being acquired. 3 3 At the same time, however, the new law
extends the carryover period to seven years.' 34 The impact of the
Act's restriction on unification activity will probably be minimal
since the additional ownership interest required will not be difficult
to obtain in the majority of cases. Congress itself expects negligible
revenue gain from the restrictions. 131
A company's allowable tax losses may be wasted unless the com-
pany has sufficient taxable income against which it is able to offset
the losses. With a present corporate income tax rate of approxi-
mately 50 percent, 3 the after-tax rate of return can be effectively
shielded by an acquired corporation's operating losses. 37 Thus, a
to qualify as a tax-free exchange. For a discussion of the origin and essence of the doctrine
see Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
130. All of the separate steps of the merger transaction must be examined together to see
whether there has been a statutory reorganization or merely a taxable exchange. See South-
well Combing Co., 30 T.C. 487 (1958).
131. Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 386-87 (1957).
132. Act of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 806(a)-(b), (d), 90 Stat. 1598.
133. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONFER-
ENCE COMPARISON ON H.R. 10612 TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 28-29 (Comm. Print 1976)
[hereinafter cited as TAX REFORM Acr OF 1976].
134. Act of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 806(a), 90 Stat. 1598.
135. TAx REFORM ACT OF 1976, supra note 133, at 38.
136. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11.
137. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 125, ch. 16.
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large tax loss carryforward is a valuable asset in a merger since it
can transform taxable profits into tax-free ones. When the situation
is reversed, and the acquiring corporation has losses while the firm
being acquired has profits, tax advantages also accrue. The tax
losses of the acquiring corporation can be combined with the profits
of the acquired firm to effect overall tax savings.'38
Another major tax incentive which may make mergers profitable
for corporations is debt-equity switching.'39 When the acquiring firm
exchanges debt securities for the common stock or assets of the
acquired firm, the interest payments on the debentures are deducti-
ble from the income of the acquiring firm;'40 tax payments on the
capital realized by the shareholders of the acquired corporation can
be deferred until the debentures become due, on the theory that the
transaction qualifies for installment treatment.' When tax deduct-
ible interest payments are substituted for nondeductible dividend
payments, the cost of capital is significantly affected.'42 With inter-
est payments, the acquiring firm pays for the stock with before-tax
income; if the acquiring firm had to pay dividends on stock it issued,
the dividends, since they are nondeductible, would have to come
from after-tax income. Because the corporate tax rate is approxi-
mately 50 percent, the after-tax income is only half as much as the
138. For example, Penn Central Railroad launched a major acquisition program with an
estimated $500-600 million tax loss carryforward. Wall Street J., Feb. 1, 1968, at 4, col. 3.
See id. April 17, 1968, at 15, col. 1.
139. During 1967-68, three of the 14 largest acquisitions accorded tax-free treatment
under § 368 of the Internal Revenue Code involved the use of debt-equity switching. Thirteen,
or nearly six percent, of the 213 large mergers occurring in 1967-68 for which tax treatment
information is available, used debt-equity switching. 1969 FTC PAPERS, supra note 40, at 256-
60.
140. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a), providing for a deduction of "all interest paid
or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."
141. 1969 FTC PAPERS, supra note 40, at 260. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 453.
142. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 411, 83 Stat. 604 (codified at INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 279), in an attempt to discourage unsound corporate financing, re-
stricted the deductibility of interest payments of large businesses to $5 million, where the
acquiring firm has a debt-to-equity ratio greater than two to one, or where the projected
earnings are no larger than three times the annual interest to be paid. See also INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 385.
Section 279 may have contributed to the decline in merger activity after 1969, but it has
been noted:
Although this change in the Internal Revenue Code does eliminate the most blatant
tax subsidy implicit in debt-equity switching (i.e., long term deferral of capital gains),
it leaves intact for most acquiring firms the valuable opportunity to deduct any new
interest payments incurred in financing an acquisition.
Lovett, supra note 110, at 863.
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income before taxes. Thus, the scheme permits a corporate acquisi-
tion at minimum cost and encourages the payment of a premium
for the acquired firm. "3 Since the tax merger exemption lowers the
tax costs of companies who sell by merger, even companies which
are not incorporated may find it advantageous to incorporate their
business, issue stock, and sell the stock to an acquiring firm in a tax-
free exchange.'" Companies and corporations engaging in such a
transaction often receive a premium for their assets because the
subsidy lowers the acquiring firm's taxes.
A corporation may also receive economic benefits because a well-
planned merger makes the stock more inviting to the investor.
Through flexible accounting principles, the merged industry's bal-
ance sheet and income statement may show apparent profits even
though the new enterprise enjoys no increase in sales or decrease in
costs.'45 The investment community may react favorably to reported
increases in earnings regardless of their source and may reward the
company by bidding up the price of its stock.
C. Effects on the Economy
Although the tax merger subsidy was created to facilitate neces-
sary corporate readjustments in the hope of revitalizing the econ-
omy, times have changed and merger activity is no longer necessar-
ily beneficial to the economy."' In 1971, an internal memorandum
of the Federal Trade Commission pointed out:
It has been estimated that if highly concentrated industries
were deconcentrated to the point where the four largest firms
control 40% or less of an industry's sales, prices would fall by
25% or more ....
With prices in a highly concentrated industry at super-
competitive levels, it is to be expected and is indeed the case,
that profit levels will be above those found in comparable, non-
concentrated industries . . . . As case studies have shown,
profits in a highly concentrated industry tend to be 50% (or
more) higher than in a moderately concentrated industry. "7
143. See 1969 FTC PAPERS, supra note 40, at 256, 260-61.
144. See 1969 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 43, pt. 7 passim.
145. See note 118 and accompanying text supra. See also 1972 FTC REPORT, supra note
39, at 89-97; 1969 FTC PAPERS, supra note 40, at 269.
146. See Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 292; Sandberg, supra note 12, at 98.
147. Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, The Case for Antitrust
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A study of conglomerate growth conducted by the Bureau of Eco-
nomics of the Federal Trade Commission in the late sixties supports
the argument that there is little justification for what is, in effect,
subsidization of large corporate mergers. 48 It indicates that there
exists little public benefit from industrial conglomeration in terms
of increased expenditures on research and development, technologi-
cal innovation, development of more efficient management tech-
niques, increased employment, and increased capital investment by
corporations and shareholders.' Merger activity threatens to con-
tinue to reduce the number of strong, healthy competitors in the
marketplace. Levels of industrial market concentration-a relevant
criterion for judging the degree of potential competition in the econ-
omy-have risen significantly. Also, there has been a steadily in-
creasing degree of concentration of assets among fewer companies. 50
For example, in 1947, the 200 largest manufacturing corporations
accounted for 47 percent of all manufacturing assets in the United
States. By 1968, the figure had risen to more than 60 percent of the
entire manufacturing sector of the national economy."' During the
1960's, a pronounced upturn in the volume of diversifying acquisi-
tions occurred.' 52 Available data suggests that the conglomerate
merger wave was concentrated among a relatively small number of
Suits Against Selected Oligopoly Industries, June 11, 1971 (unpublished memorandum from
the Bureau to the FTC, reproduced in Moffitt, The Corporate Economy and the National
Budget, in THE PROBLEM OF THE FEDERAL BuDGET 9, 12 (The Study Group on the Federal
Budget, Institute for Policy Studies/Transnational ed. 1975)). It should be pointed out that
the FTC's memorandum refers to market concentration, as opposed to asset concentration.
Conglomerate mergers directly increase the asset control of the acquiring firm, but may or
may not increase market concentration, depending on the relevant line of commerce of the
acquired firm. See C. BERRY, CORPORATE GROWTH AND DIVERSIFICATION 153 (1975).
148. See generally 1969 FTC PAPERS, supra note 40, at 262, 264-313.
149. Some economists, however, are not convinced that a conglomerate merger increases
the acquiring firm's share in a given market, and argue that it has not yet been demonstrated
that competition in a line of commerce or relevant market has been injured by mergers. See
Stelzer, Antitrust Policy and the Conglomerates, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 196, 204 (1969). See
also Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of the Anti-
Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1231 (1968).
150. Moffitt, The Corporate Economy and the National Budget, in THE PROBLEM OF THE
FEDERAL BUDGET 9, 10 (The Study Group on the Federal Budget, Institute for Policy Stud-
ies/Transnational ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Moffitt]. See 1969 FTC PAPERS, supra note
40, at 246-47, 250-54.
151. Mueller, The Rising Economic Concentration in America: Reciprocity, Conglomera-
tion, and the New American "Zaibatsu" System, 4 ANTrrRUST LAW& ECON. REV. 15, 50 (1971).
See generally 1969 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 43, pt. 7, at 2363; Moffitt, supra note
150, at 10.
152. See 1972 FTC REPORT, supra note 40, at 61-85.
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companies.' As a group, the 25 most active acquiring companies
made acquisitions totaling $20 billion between 1961 and 1968. This
represented nearly 60 percent of all the assets acquired by the top
200 acquiring corporations during the period." 4
The loss of revenue by the Treasury as a result of the tax merger
subsidy is also a major concern. The Bureau of Economics of the
Federal Trade Commission has estimated that, in 1968 alone, non-
assessable taxes on capital gains from 350 of the largest tax-free
mergers amounted to at least several hundred million dollars.'55
Furthermore, since stockholders generally hold their shares for some
time after mergers, the gain upon which they are ultimately taxed
may be less than it would be immediately before the merger, when
values traditionally increase. Technically, taxes on capital gains
resulting from corporate reorganizations are not lost, but are de-
ferred until the shareholder liquidates his investment in the merged
enterprise. 5 ' Yet, even the deferral of realized gains arguably is
equivalent to an interest-free government loan of the amount de-
ferred. Given the present high interest rates, the federal government
should not subsidize shareholders and their investment sales absent
a showing that the public is significantly benefitted by such a sub-
sidy. "' 7 Moreover, this deferral, in some cases, has amounted to a
complete exemption: until recently, shareholders who died holding
their investment could leave their shares to heirs who acquired a
"stepped up" basis, thus avoiding all tax on the appreciation in
153. One authority has concluded:
The large volume of diversifying acquisitions was spread highly unevenly over the
corporate population. While a scant 2 percent of all reporting companies made more
than 30 diversifying acquisitions in 1961-1970, nearly two-thirds made 3 or less, and
84 percent made 8 or less.
J. MARKHAM, CONGLOMERATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC POLICY 167 (1973).
154. See 1969 FTC PAPERS, supra note 40, at 272.
155. See id. at 256-57. The Bureau of Economics has further observed:
It is not possible to make a precise estimate of the magnitude of capital gains
accruing to shareholders of acquiring companies. However, typically the exchange
value at the time of acquisition represents at least a 15 percent premium over market
value prior to the announcement of the acquisition . . . . Thus, "merger created"
capital gains, alone, may well have exceeded $2 billion in 1968.
Id. at 257 n.13.
156. Id. at 257.
157. For a taxpayer in the 60 percent tax bracket, the deferral of tax on income for 10
years excludes nearly one-half of that "income"; a 20-year deferral is equivalent to excluding
68 percent of the income. This result obtains in addition to the fact that deferral of tax




value occurring before the death of the owner.""8 Under the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, however, the heir acquires stock with the dece-
dent's cost basis. 59
The amount of revenue that has not been taxed as a result of loss
carryovers is difficult to estimate. Penn Central Railroad, for exam-
ple, with its estimated tax loss carryover potential of $500-$600
million, could theoretically escape paying up to $270 million in cor-
porate income taxes. 10 Assuming a $1 billion tax loss in capital
gains taxes and a loss of $2 billion in corporate income taxes as a
result of tax loss carryovers, this combined loss of revenue exceeds
1.5 percent of the total revenue received by the government for the
fiscal year 1969.111 In sum, the tax merger subsidy provides a lucra-
tive benefit to consolidating corporations at the expense of the pub-
lic treasury.
Conclusion
The historical economic rationale for a tax subsidy for unifying
corporations can be seen today as serving neither the public policy
goals of an equitable tax structure, nor the legitimate needs of the
business community. When Congress first considered and adopted
the reorganization provisions, income taxes were much lower and
the tax concessions afforded unifying businesses had little effect on
government revenues, on the industry structure, or on the strength
of competition. Indeed, the faltering economy made it "desirable to
encourage flexibility in rearranging combinations of business capi-
tal."'' 2 Today these policy considerations are no longer viable. The
corporate tax unification provisions have some influence on control
of major segments of the American economy by fewer and fewer
corporate entities. Too many large mergers may threaten healthy
competition, distort market forces affecting industrial asset concen-
tration, effect a serious loss of information regarding corporate
wealth to shareholders and potential investors, and dangerously
centralize industrial decision-making; in an age of high inflation
and low employment, the impact of increased corporate unifications
158. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014.
159. Act of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1872.
160. See Wall Street J., April 17, 1968, at 15, col. 1.
161. See J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY, Table C-3, at 288-89 (rev. ed. 1971).
162. Lovett, supra note 110, at 852. See generally Cohen, supra note 115.
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on the overall performance of the economy cannot be ignored. The
present existence of high income and capital gains tax rates for the
sale of most business assets makes the opportunity for tax avoid-
ance and manipulation through mergers even more unjust. Large
mergers generally do represent a substantial change in business
organizations, a significant economic gain for shareholders, and
have an important impact upon aggregate industrial asset con-
centration."3 An appraisal of these external costs of merger acti-
vity, particularly in view of the recent rapid growth of conglomer-
ates, suggests that despite the private benefits afforded by a tax
subsidy for mergers, their favorable tax treatment is unjustified
and should be eliminated.
As legislative history indicates, congressional attempts in the past
to deal in piecemeal fashion with the tax avoidance features of the
reorganization provisions have been largely ineffective. One may
reluctantly conclude that the best alternative may be to return to
tax treatment prior to 1918, when mergers, acquisitions and other
corporate reorganizations were examined on a case by case basis to
determine whether gains would be deemed taxable events. Cer-
tainly, congressional responsibility should be assumed to insure that
the tax system has a neutral effect on business decision-making, and
therefore on industrial structure. All acquisitions currently covered
by section 368 need not be granted tax free status; other Code provi-
sions which serve as an incentive to acquisition need not apply to
large acquiring enterprises."'
163. Lovett, supra note 110, at 851.
164. See, e.g., 1969 FTC PAERns, supra note 40, at 262 (tax reform recommendations for
consideration by the House Ways and Means Committee submitted by the Bureau of Eco-
nomics of the Federal Trade Commission). Since heightened corporate unification activity
has not accompanied the recovery of the prime interest rate, stock prices, and gross national
product in the mid-seventies, it may be argued that other variables exert a greater influence
on corporate decision-making than the tax subsidies for unifying corporations. Thus, an
empirical study which isolates the tax variants in corporate diversification decisions and
determines their relative weights should precede further recommendations for legislative
action.
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